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Abstract 
Using a dataset that merges information of loan applications from the Spanish CCR with firms’
financial accounts, we find that during the great recession access to credit of firms with weak
balance sheets deteriorated relative to other firms. However, contrary to the financial
accelerator theory, we find that during the recovery phase after the latest recession access to
credit of weaker firms did not improve relative to other firms and it even further deteriorated
somewhat. We also provide empirical evidence that lending policies of banks with firms they
are exposed to before the lending decision is taken are comparatively less sensitive to public
information than those applied to new firms. This result, together with the positive correlation 
we find between firms’ access to bank loans and the number of firms’ bank credit
relationships, might be linked to the existence of private information developed by banks
through their interaction with borrowers. We also find that this relationship lending contributed 
to smooth credit contraction during the crisis. 
Keywords: access to credit, borrower-lender relationships, loan applications. 





En este trabajo se explota una base de datos que fusiona la información sobre peticiones de
crédito de la Central de Información de Riesgos con los estados contables de las empresas,
mostrándose evidencia de que, durante la gran recesión que se inició en 2008, el acceso al 
crédito de las empresas españolas que presentaban una situación financiera más débil se
deterioró en comparación con el del resto de empresas. Sin embargo, en contra de lo que
indica la teoría del acelerador financiero, se encuentra que, durante la etapa de recuperación 
económica tras la última recesión, el acceso al crédito de las empresas con una situación
financiera más débil no mejoró en relación con el del resto de compañías e incluso se deterioró 
algo. También se aporta evidencia empírica de que las políticas crediticias de los bancos con 
las empresas con las que mantenían relaciones crediticias previas son comparativamente
menos sensibles a la información pública que aquellas aplicadas a las empresas con las que
no mantenían relaciones previas. Este resultado, junto con la correlación positiva entre el
acceso al crédito bancario de las empresas y el número de relaciones bancarias de estas, 
podría estar vinculado a la existencia de información privada adquirida por los bancos a lo
largo de sus interacciones con sus deudores. Por último, también se encuentra que la
existencia de estas relaciones entre deudores y acreedores habría contribuido a moderar
la contracción del crédito durante la crisis. 
Palabras clave: acceso al crédito, relaciones deudor-acreedor, peticiones de crédito. 
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1 Introduction 
Credit rationing is a well-established feature of credit markets. Its existence has been 
rationalised in the literature with the presence of various frictions and, in particular, with 
asymmetric information problems between lenders and borrowers. Theory suggests that 
access of firms to credit depends on the strength of their balance sheets and on their riskiness. 
In particular, firms with stronger balance sheets have a better access to credit than other firms. In 
the empirical literature, the most common variables used to proxy for the strength of the 
balance sheets are leverage and profitability. The riskiness of the firm is generally proxied by  
the existence of delinquent loans. There is also ample evidence that access of firms to credit is 
positively correlated with the size and age of the firm.  
Another strand of literature emphasizes the role of borrower-lender relationships in 
mitigating the asymmetric information problems (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell 
(1992)). This literature argues that financial institutions, through their interactions with firms, 
develop private information about the firm’s financial prospects that can be useful in the 
decision to extend credit (Diamond, 1984). There is some empirical evidence that lenders are 
more likely to extend credit to firms with which they have pre-existing relationships (Cole, 
1998). Some recent papers also document how the so called relationship lending can be an 
effective tool to smooth fluctuations in credit (Sette and Gobbi (2015), Bolton et al (2016)). 
The banks’ credit supply fluctuates over time and these changes can have important 
implications for economic growth in terms of both investment and employment [Alfaro, García-
Santa and Moral-Benito(2017), Amiti, Weinstein (2018), Bentolila, Jansen and Jiménez (2018), 
Chodorow-Reich (2014), Cingano, Manaresi and Sette (2016), Greenstone, Mas and Nguyen 
(2015), Huber (2018), Jiménez, Mian, Peydró and Saurina (2014), Khwaja, Mian (2008)]. 
There is evidence in the literature that banks’ credit supply fluctuate with the business 
cycle and with the changes in the monetary policy stance [Jiménez et al (2014), Jiménez et al 
(2012b), Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, Suárez (2017), Dell’Ariccia and Márquez (2006)]. In particular, this 
literature finds that bank lending standards tend to soften during times of strong economic 
growth and expansionary monetary policies and tend to tighten during crisis and contractionary 
monetary policies. There are different theories that provide a rationale for the changes in credit 
supply along the business cycle including herd behaviour (Rajan, 1994), agency problems 
(Williamson,1963) and institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2004). 
The changes in lending standards can affect firms heterogeneously on the basis of 
their characteristics implying changes in credit allocation across firms. In particular, some 
papers show that during recessions borrowers with weak balance sheets experience a 
reduced access to credit relative to other borrowers (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist,  
1996; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina, 2012a; Rodano, Serrano and Tarantino, 2017; 
Jiménez, Moral-Benito and Vegas, 2018). The financial accelerator theory provides a rationale 
for this pattern, arguing that the changes in the access to credit along the business cycle 
amplify the fluctuations of the initial shocks (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1996).  
This paper analyses how bank’s borrower selection changes along the business cycle 
using Spanish data covering the latest boom bust credit cycle. Spain is an interesting case 
study because the latest credit cycle has been particularly marked. Between 2000 and 2007 
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bank lending to firms grew at an annual average rate of 19%. During the great recession that 
started in 2008 and ended in mid-2013, bank lending to firms contracted at an average y-o-y 
rate of 4%, reaching the maximum y-o-y decline in June 2013 (10%). Since then the 
outstanding stock of bank lending has continued falling but the speed of contraction has 
moderated progressively against a background of an economic recovery.  
The analysis of this paper is based on a dataset of loan applications matched with firm 
balance-sheet data. More specifically, through the information requests on firms´ credit 
situation from banks to the Spanish Central Credit Registry (CCR), we can identify a subset of 
firms seeking for bank financing, and we can also infer whether those firms finally obtained it by 
looking at the evolution of their credit balances in a certain period of time. We match this 
information with balance-sheet data to characterize the firm´s economic and financial situation. 
With this dataset we estimate various models for the probability of firms’ success in 
their search for bank funding as a function of their characteristics. In contrast with other 
previous papers (Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina, 2012a; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and 
Saurina, 2012b; Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró and Saurina, 2014; Jiménez, Moral-Benito and 
Vegas, 2018 for the Spanish CCR and Albertazzi, Bottero and Sene, 2014, for the Italian one), 
in which the success in the search for bank funding is defined at the firm-bank level, and in line 
with Galardo, Lozi and Mistrulli (2017), we define this success at the firm level. In other words, 
we want to know whether a firm searching for bank funding managed to obtain funds from any 
bank irrespectively of how many banks have actually approved the loan application of that firm. 
This approach is justified for two reasons. First, the main aim of the paper is to analyse how 
credit allocation to firms changes along the business cycle and, in particular, we want to know 
what type of firms obtain the new credit extended by the banking system in different phases of 
the business cycle. Second, by doing that we are able to take into account credit provided by 
banks that have current exposures to firms, something that is not possible with the information 
from CCRs when the success in the search for bank funding is defined at the firm-bank level. 
We show that this credit accounts for a significant proportion of overall credit extended by 
banks. This approach also allows us to compare banks’ lending standards depending on 
whether the bank has or has not exposures to a firm before the lending decision is taken. This 
is an important contribution of the paper. 
In line with the prediction of the financial accelerator theory and with previous empirical 
papers, we find evidence that during the great recession access to credit of firms with weak 
balance sheets deteriorated relative to other firms. In other words, during the crisis banks 
discriminated more among firms according to the strength of their balance sheets. However, 
contrary to this theory and to the relationship between bank’s borrower selection and GDP 
growth found in other empirical papers (Jiménez, Moral-Benito and Vegas, 2018), we find that 
during the recovery phase after the latest recession access to credit of weaker firms did not 
improve relative to other firms and that it even further deteriorated somewhat. To the best of 
our knowledge, this is the first paper that finds this result. 
Additionally, and in contrast with other papers that estimate the probability of firm’s 
success in the search for bank funding using CCRs, we assess the extent to which loan 
policies of banks with firms they have exposures before the lending decision is taken (old firms) 
differ from those with firms they are not exposed (new firms). In particular, we provide empirical 
evidence that lending policies with old firms are comparatively less sensitive to public 
information and that this relationship lending contributed to smooth credit contraction during 
the crisis. We also find that the number of bank credit relationships improves the access of 
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firms to bank loans. We argue that these results might be linked to the existence of private 
information developed by banks through their interaction with borrowers (Diamond, 1984; Cole, 
1998). This is another contribution of the paper. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data, Section 3 
presents the empirical strategy, Section 4 shows the results and, finally, Section 5 concludes.  
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2 Data  
The database is made up combining two sources of information. First, we have access to 
information requests on firms by banks to the Spanish CCR. It is important to note that banks 
only submit information requests to the CCR for firms they have no current exposures with 
since for other firms they receive the CCR information by default. These information requests 
allows us to identify a subset of firms seeking for a bank loan. In particular, we identify those 
firms1 seeking for a loan when their application is submitted to a bank they have not credit 
outstanding balances with (we will call these banks, new banks). On the other hand, as the 
CCR also contains information on the outstanding credit balances,2 by looking at the evolution 
of them, we can infer whether or not the firm actually obtained the funds from the new bank or 
from any other bank (including those that the firm had already credit exposures with, which we 
will call old banks). In particular, in line with other papers using CCRs, we look at the change of 
outstanding loans and credit facilities between the month prior to the request of information 
and the following three months. If we observe an increase in the outstanding balances of credit 
for that particular firm we assume that the loan application was accepted. 
We observe that most firms apply for a loan to more than one new bank around the 
same time (in particular to 1.3 new banks on average).3 Thus, firms seem to be shopping 
around for the same loan trying to maximize the probability of obtaining a loan and, eventually, 
getting the best conditions. We define loan approval at the firm level. More precisely, in line with 
Galardo, Lozi and Mistrulli (2017) we consider a loan application submitted by the same firm to 
different banks with no more than three months between each request as a single loan 
application. 
Second, to characterize firms’ economic and financial situation, data from the Central 
Balance Sheet Data Office (CBBO)4 are used. This dataset contains information on the financial 
accounts of non-financial corporations (balance sheets and profit and loss accounts) of around 
600,000 firms on an annual basis. Thus, by matching the fiscal identification number of firms 
seeking for bank loans obtained from the CCR with that of the ones included in the CBBO, we 
can merge the two datasets. As the frequency of these two datasets are different, it is 
assumed that the annual firm characteristics are constant throughout the natural year, therefore 
assigning the same value in all months of the same year. The combined dataset contains 
1,241,365 monthly observations (i. e. firm loan applications) for the period from January 2004 
to June 2016, corresponding to 579,518 firms.5  
 
                                                                          
1 More precisely, limited and non-limited liability companies and cooperatives are considered in this paper. 
2 The CCR contains detailed individualised data (such as credit balances or the volume of non-performing loans) on  
all the loans granted by credit institutions in Spain for amounts in excess of €6,000 with a monthly frequency. 
3 We can only observe the applications to new banks. So this figure would be a lower bound for the total number of 
banks (new and old) that would receive the loan application. 
4 For a detailed description of the Central Balance Sheet Data Office, see http://www.bde.es/bde/es/secciones/ 
informes/Publicaciones_an/Central_de_Balan/. 
5 This is the number of observations once atypical values are excluded from the database. In particular, the 0.25% and 
99.75% percentiles of observations of each variable are deleted. 
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3 Empirical strategy  
Several linear probability models are estimated to assess the probability of firms’ success in 
their search for bank funding depending on a series of firm characteristics and a set of fixed 
effects. Coefficients are allowed to differ by sub-periods in order to test for the existence of 
changes in the elasticities along the business cycle.6 In particular, based on GDP growth of the 
Spanish economy, three sub-periods were established: the expansionary phase prior to the 
crisis (which covers the period from 2005:1 to 2008:3), when GDP growth was positive; the 
crisis period (which covers from 2008:4 to 2013:9), when GDP growth was negative or equal to 
zero; and the recovery stage (which covers from 2013:10 to 2016:6), in which GDP growth 
became positive again. 
The basic specification to be estimated is the following: 
                         (1) 
where Loanit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the search for a loan that started in month t 
by firm i ends successfully within the following three months and 0 otherwise; Xiz,t-1 is a vector 
of Z characteristics of the firm i in month t-1;7 P2t and P3t are dummy variables that equal 1 for 
the crisis and recovery sub-periods, respectively, and 0 otherwise; fei are firm fixed effects; fet 
are time fixed effects- and uit is the perturbation term. In particular, we include firm fixed effects 
to account for particular invariant characteristics of the firm throughout the sample, such as 
legal status or geographical situation.8 On the other hand, month fixed effects are included, 
aiming to capture the cyclical position of the economy. It is important to stress out that with this 
specification we intend to investigate the firm features that determine its actual access to 
credit, regardless of the bank characteristics that may influence on it. 
We assume that a firm is seeking for a loan when we observe an information request. 
And we assume that the search for a loan that started in month t by firm i ends successfully 
within the following three months if the overall outstanding stock of bank credit plus credit lines 
of that particular firm increases between month t-1 and month t+3.  
3.1 Dependent variables 
In the paper, we consider two alternative dependent variables (see definitions in Table 1). The 
first variable equals 1 if the loan is granted by any bank (new or old bank) and 0 otherwise.  
The second variable equals 1 if the loan is granted by at least one new bank and 0 otherwise. The 
first variable is the main variable of interest since it takes into account all credit granted to our 
sample of firms seeking for a loan. The second variable, which is more restrictive, is useful to 
analyse the extent to which banks’ loan policies with firms differ depending on the existence of 
pre-existing credit exposures. There are two main reasons to expect that banks’ loan policies 
can be different with new firms (firms which do not have outstanding credit balances with a 
particular bank before the submission of the application) vis-à-vis old firms (those which have 
outstanding credit balances with a particular bank before the submission of the application). 
                                                                          
6 All estimates were made clustering at firm level. 
7 All independent variables are lagged one period, as that is the public information for the bank that was available when 
it received the loan application. 
8 The introduction of firm fixed effects means that the coefficients of the variables of interest are estimated using the time 
variation for those firms which are observed at least twice during each sub-period. In the interpretation of results we 
will assume that these coefficients are the same for all firms. 





BANCO DE ESPAÑA 12 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1826 
First, through interactions with “old” firms banks develop private information about their 
riskiness that can be useful in the decision to extend credit (Diamond, 1984). Second, 
regardless of the possible existence of private information, the optimal lending policy with new 
firms can differ compared to that with old firms. For example, the rejection of an application 
submitted by an old firm with difficulties in its access to external finance might end up in the 
default of existing loans. Therefore, banks might have incentives to approve loan applications 
submitted by old firms even if the current financial position of those firms is weak. All in all, this 
discussion suggests that banks’ lending policies with old firms might be less sensitive to firms’ 
public information than those policies applied to new firms. We test for this hypothesis in the 
next Section. 
Chart 1 shows the percentage of successful firms (success rate), i. e. the percentage 
of firms that obtained bank funding, per year according to the two definitions. As it was 
expected, during the great recession that started in 2008, the success rate declined strongly, 
suggesting a deterioration in the access of firms to credit. During 2008 and 2009 the fall in the 
success rate was more dramatic when old banks are not considered, suggesting that during 
this period old banks smoothed somehow the decline in the access of firms to credit. In the 
following years, the success rate using the second definition (i.e. old banks are excluded) fell 
more gradually, whereas the one computed using the first definition (i. e. old banks are also 
considered) showed a more gradual decline during the crisis. It was not until 2013, along with 
the economic recovery of the Spanish economy, when the success rate using the second 
definition increased, and one year later when all banks are considered. By mid-2016, these 
proportions were around 15 pp lower than in 2005. 
It is worth noting that the success rate using the first definition is, on average, around 
25 pp higher than that obtained with the second definition, being the differences relatively 
stable along the sample period (see Chart 1 and Table 2). This illustrates the importance of 
including old banks in the analysis of credit allocation, something which has been neglected in 
previous papers based on CCRs’ loan applications. 
Finally, the descriptive statistics of Table 2 show that the dispersion of the dependent 
variables, proxied by their standard deviation, was relatively stable by sub-periods.   
3.2 Independent variables 
Among firms’ explanatory variables, we include those related to firms’ financial and economic 
situation. In particular, we consider the following: indebtedness (calculated as the costly debt 
that is, total debt minus trade credit liabilities, minus cash and other liquid assets, over total 
assets), financial burden (defined as the financial costs over the gross operating profit plus the 
financial revenues),9 and ROA (measured as ordinary return over net assets). We also include a 
measure of total factor productivity (TFP), in logarithms, calculated following Wooldridge 
(2009)10 and a measure of collateral availability of the firm, calculated as the total tangible fixed 
assets over total assets. As a measure of the riskiness of the firm we use the previous doubtful 
loan variable, which is a dummy that equals one if the firm had in the previous month any non-
performing loans with any bank and zero otherwise. We also include the number of banks with 
which the firm had credit relationships in the previous month. The information of the latest two 
variables is obtained from the CCR. Finally, we include the age (logarithm of the number  
                                                                          
9 In those cases in which the financial burden was negative –given that the denominator, as a proxy for profits, could be 
negative–, the maximum level of the financial burden ratio in the corresponding year has been assigned. This decision 
was taken because a negative value for this variable means a weak financial position. 
10 The method suggested in Wooldridge (2009) basically consists on estimating a Cobb-Douglas production function 
equation for the sector of the firm, and applying the sector estimated coefficients to the individual firm data. 
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of years of existence of the company plus one) and the size (logarithm of total assets) of the 
firm. Table 1 shows a summary of all the independent variables included in our estimations. 
An array of some descriptive statistics for the firm variables can be found in Table 2. It 
is worth mentioning first that the standard deviation of the variables is relatively high suggesting 
a high dispersion of firm characteristics. The percentage of firms with outstanding doubtful 
loans grew notably during the crisis and rose even more, on average, during the third sub-
period covering the recovery phase. The median and average indebtedness of firms in the 
sample fell during the great recession sub-period and continued falling in the recovery sub-
period after the crisis in line with the significant deleveraging of the corporate sector that has 
taken place in the Spanish economy since the outbreak of the crisis. Median and average 
financial burden, on the contrary, increased during the crisis since the reduction in 
indebtedness was more than offset by the contraction of profits (denominator of this variable). 
During the economic recovery sub-period the average financial burden remained relatively 
stable whereas the median value fell. It is remarkable that the dispersion of this variable has 
steadily risen along the three sub-periods. The average and median values of ROA decreased 
during the great recession sub-period and declined more in the third sub-period covering the 
recovery phase. As regards TFP, both the average and the median values little changed during 
the crisis sub-period whereas they increased during the recovery one. The average number of 
bank relationship fell along the sample period from 2.6 in the expansionary sub-period before 
the crisis to 2.2 in the economic recovery sub-period. It is noticeable that in this last sub-period 
less than 50% of firms had more than one bank relationship. The average (and median) values 
for the size variable increased between the first and the second sub-periods and remained 
stable during the third one. By contrast, the median and average age of firms showed an 
upward trend along the sample period considered. Finally, on average, the proportion of firms´ 
tangible assets rose somewhat during the crisis and decreased in the last sub-period.  
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4 Results  
For each of the two dependent variables considered, several specifications of the general 
equation previously described have been estimated. First, we estimate the most general 
specification, where all independent variables are included (specification 1). Given that ROA is 
strongly correlated to both TFP and financial burden –as its denominator is a measure of 
profitability–, we have included four additional specifications in which we consider different 
combinations of these three variables (specifications 2 to 5). And lastly, we present the 
specification that includes only the most relevant variables (in terms of statistical significance) 
for which reasonable results (in terms of theoretical grounds) have been obtained (specification 6). 
In the Section 4.4, we carry out a robustness analysis using a specification in which the 
probability of a firm i obtaining a loan from a particular new bank j is modelled as a function of 
firm variables, including firm fixed effects to account for time-invariant demand factors and 
bank-time effects to account for time-varying supply factors.  
4.1 Probability of obtaining a loan with any bank 
Table 3 shows the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables for the probability of 
obtaining a loan with any bank, which is our main dependent variable. Given the use of dummy 
interacted variables, the coefficients of the regression measure the total impact of independent 
variables for the first sub-period and the additional marginal impact for the two other sub-
periods. Table 4 shows the total impact of each independent variable in every sub-period.11  
As expected, and in line with the results of other papers, we find evidence that during 
the expansionary period before the crisis firms’ indebtedness was negatively associated with 
the probability of success in loan applications. The coefficient of this variable is negative and 
statistically significant in all specifications. An increase of 1 pp on the debt ratio would translate 
in a reduction of the probability of success in the loan application of between 0.02 pp and 0.04 pp. 
By contrast, the coefficients of the other variables that capture the strength of firms’ balance 
sheets (financial burden, ROA) or the creditworthiness of the firm (previous doubtful loans) are 
either not statistically significant or they are only weakly significant across the different 
specifications. These results therefore suggest that firms’ indebtedness was a key variable for 
the success of loan applications during the expansionary period before the crisis. 
We also find evidence that during the pre-crisis period the probability of success in 
loan applications increased with the number of bank relationships, in line with the results of 
Cole (1998). This result is consistent with the idea that banks develop private information 
through their relationships with borrowers that can be useful in the decision to extend credit 
(Diamond,1984).  
According to the estimation results, during the expansionary period before the crisis 
TFP was positively correlated with the probability of success in loan applications. The 
coefficient of this variable is positive and statistically significant in the specifications in which this 
variable is included. The size of the firm, proxied by total assets, did not seem to have affected 
the outcome of loan applications before the crisis. The coefficient of age is positive, suggesting 
that older firms have a better access to credit, but it is only statistically significant  
                                                                          
11 This Table shows the level of the coefficients for the variables of interest for each sub-period and whether or not they 
are statistically significant. By contrast, Table 3 shows the level these coefficients for the first sub-period (expansion 
before the crisis) and the difference of these coefficients between sub-periods 2 (crisis) and 1 and between sub-
periods 3 (recovery after the crisis) and 1. 
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in specifications 1 and 2. Lastly, the coefficient of the percentage of tangible assets, which is a 
measure of the collateral available to the firm when seeking for financing, is significant in the 
years previous to the crisis but shows a striking negative effect, contrary to what would be 
expected.  
The estimated coefficients for the variables that interact the dummy P2 with firm 
characteristics, which capture the marginal effects for the great recession sub-period, show 
that the sensitivity of the probability of success in loan applications to the strength of firms’ 
balance sheets increased during this phase relative to the pre-crisis period. In particular, the 
coefficients that capture the marginal effects during this period associated to firms’ 
indebtedness and firms’ financial burden are both statistically significant across all 
specifications and their sign is negative. The financial burden, which seems to have been 
irrelevant for banks in their lending policies during the years prior to the crisis, turned out to be 
an important determinant for the outcome of loan applications during the great recession (see 
Table 4). This evidence suggests that during the great recession banks’ lending decisions 
became more sensitive to changes in the financial position of firms.  
The coefficient that measures the marginal impact of the number of bank relationships 
is also statistically significant in all specifications and has a positive sign, suggesting that this 
variable had a more important role during the great recession than in the years prior to the 
crisis when it comes to the access of firms to bank loans. Similarly, the share of tangible assets 
of the firm had an additional negative impact during the crisis, which is statistically significant. 
Size and age of the firm, which according to the results were irrelevant for bank 
lending policies in the pre-crisis period in most of the specifications, turned out to be 
consistently important variables during the great recession. By contrast, the impact of TFP on 
the outcome of loan applications was not statistically different during the crisis.  
In line with the results obtained for the marginal impacts during the great recession, 
the estimated coefficients for the variables that interact the dummy P3 with firm characteristics, 
which capture the marginal effects for the recovery sub-period, show that the sensitivity of the 
probability of success in loan applications to the strength of firms’ balance sheets increased 
during the recovery phase relative to the pre-crisis period. At the same time, the estimated 
coefficients that measure these marginal effects are larger than those corresponding to the 
crisis period suggesting that banks’ lending decisions became even more sensitive to changes 
in the financial position of firms during the economic upturn. 
Also, in line with the marginal effects for the crisis sub-period, we find evidence that 
during the recovery the number of bank relationships and the size of the firm played a more 
important role than in the years prior to the crisis when it comes to the outcome of loan 
applications. By contrast, the opposite is found for age and TFP. Thus, these variables became 
less important determinants of the access of firms to bank loans in the recovery sub-period. 
4.2 Probability of obtaining a loan with at least one new bank 
When lending decisions of old banks are not considered, some of the main results remain (see 
Tables 5 and 6 for the marginal and the total impacts, by sub-periods, of the explanatory 
variables on the probability of obtaining a loan with at least one new bank). In particular, the 
strength of firms’ balance sheets are positively associated with the probability of success in 
loan applications and its impact increased during the crisis and it did so even further during  
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the recovery. Also, the share of tangible assets show an unexpected negative effect on the 
probability of obtaining a loan.  
However, there are also some remarkable differences in the results that are worth 
noting. First, the coefficients of the variables that measure the creditworthiness of firms and the 
strength of their balance sheets are larger (in absolute terms) and are more significant than in 
the case in which old bank lending decisions were considered. In particular, the existence of 
doubtful loans becomes an important variable when it comes to access to bank loans. 
According to the estimates of specification 6, having previous doubtful loans reduced the 
probability of obtaining a loan with at least one new bank by 11 pp during the expansionary 
period before the crisis, against 2 pp when old banks are considered, and by 14 pp during the 
recovery phase (against 4 pp when old banks are considered). Also, the coefficient for the 
financial burden variable, which was not statistically significant in the years prior to the crisis in 
the estimates presented in Section 4.1, now becomes statistically significant in that period and 
rises throughout the sample period. Likewise, the coefficients of indebtedness rise notably 
compared to the results of Section 4.1.  
Second, in contrast with the results presented in Section 4.1, the number of bank 
relationships reduces the chances that banks extend credit to new firms (i. e. firms with which 
they do not have existing exposures). This result is consistent with the evidence reported by 
Cole (1998). 
And third, age and total assets have in some specifications and sub-periods a 
negative effect on the probability of success in loan applications being their coefficients 
statistically significant in some cases. These results could be related to a possible bias in our 
sample. In particular, the CCR only provides information on loan applications from firms that 
apply for loans to banks with which they have no previous exposure. In this regard, this finding 
could reflect the fact that larger and older firms applying for loans to banks with which they 
have no exposure tend to be riskier than other firms with similar observable characteristics. In 
particular, some of those firms may be seeking loans from new banks because their usual 
banks have refused to grant them funding in view of their perceived poor credit quality.  
These results therefore provide some evidence that lending policies of banks differ 
depending on whether or not the bank has exposures to the firm that has submitted the loan 
application. In particular, our results suggest that banks discriminate more among firms 
according to the public information on their financial situation when they lend to “new”  
firms than when they lend to “old” ones (i. e. firms with which they have existing exposures). 
4.3 Illustration of results 
To illustrate the implications of the previous results we compute the estimated probability of 
success in loan applications using both definitions (i.e. including and excluding old banks, 
respectively) for three different representative firms with constant characteristics over time: the 
median firm, a firm with a stronger financial situation and a firm with a weaker financial situation. 
To compute these probabilities for the median firm, we take the median value over the whole 
sample period of every independent variable and keep its value constant over time. For firms in 
a weaker and a stronger financial positions, the value of the 90th and 10th percentiles, 
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respectively, of the financial burden and the indebtedness are taken and the median for the 
other variables.12  
Chart 2 displays the results of this exercise. It can be seen that during the 
expansionary period prior to the crisis, the probability of success in loan applications was very 
similar among the different types of firms for both definitions, suggesting that banks 
discriminated very little among them depending on their financial strength. From 2007 onwards, 
the probability of success in loan applications declined for all firms but the decrease was more 
marked for those with higher debt and financial burden ratios than for those in a better financial 
situation. As a result, the gap in probabilities between these firms widened significantly. During 
the recovery phase that started in the second half of 2013, this gap widened even more. These 
findings suggest that since the outbreak of the crisis banks have been discriminating more 
depending on the firm characteristics than they used to do before the great recession.  
The comparison between the estimated probabilities using the two definitions confirms 
the results of Chart 1. First, it can be seen that the estimated probability of obtaining a loan 
with any bank is significantly higher than that obtained when old banks are excluded. Second, 
at the beginning of the crisis, the estimated probability of obtaining a loan with at least a new 
bank adjusted faster than that of obtaining funds with any bank, suggesting that old banks 
tended to smooth the reduction in the availability of credit. And third, the recovery in the 
probability of success in loan applications started one year earlier when old banks are not 
considered (2013 vs 2014).  
Finally, Chart 2 also shows that, in mid-2016, the probability of obtaining a loan with 
any bank was around 14 pp and 6 pp lower than in 2005 for the weaker and stronger firms, 
respectively. And the probability of obtaining a loan with at least one new bank has fallen by 11 
pp and 1 pp, respectively, between these dates. 
4.4 Robustness analysis 
It could be argued that the above estimations could potentially be biased because the 
specification does not account for unobservable heterogeneity of banks. In particular, the 
higher discrimination among firms according to the strength of their balance sheets that we 
document after the crisis could potentially be the result of the fact that weak firms only apply for 
loans to bad banks and these banks were not in a position to lend any firm. To rule out this 
hypothesis and check the robustness of our results to the unobservable heterogeneity of 
banks, in this Section we use a specification at the firm-bank level that includes both firm fixed 
effects to account for time-invariant demand factors and bank-time fixed effects to account for 
time-varying supply factors. In particular, we consider the following specification: 
                         (2) 
where Loanijt is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the loan application by firm i to bank j  
ends successfully, fej*fet are bank-time fixed effects (Xiz,t-1, fei, P2t, and P3t are defined as in 
equation (1)). 
Tables 7 and 8 show the results of the estimations. As can be seen, the estimated 
coefficients and their significance are quite similar to those obtained in Section 4.2. Like before, 
the less financially sound the position of the firm is, the less likely it is for the firm to obtain the 
                                                                          
12 The average firm fixed effect for the whole period is considered for the three types of firms. For each month, the 
corresponding fixed time effect is included. 
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loan; the age, the number of previous bank relationships and the amount of tangible assets 
also diminishes the probability of obtaining financing; size has a positive or negative effect 
depending on the period; and productivity has in general a positive impact. At the same time, in 
line with the previous results, the coefficients related to the strength of firm’s balance sheets 
increase in absolute terms during the crisis and the recovery period, confirming the change in 
bank’s lending policies since the onset of the crisis. In other words, these results confirm that 
the higher discrimination of banks among firms according to the strength of their balance 
sheets since the onset of the crisis that we document in previous sections is robust to time-
varying unobservable supply factors. 
To illustrate these results, Chart 3 displays the average probability of obtaining a loan 
from any new bank for the three different representative firms with constant characteristics over 
time13 -the median firm, a firm with a stronger financial situation and a firm with a weaker 
financial situation. This Chart is very similar to the right hand panel of Chart 2. Again, the 
probability of being granted a loan diminished after the onset of the crisis for all the firms, but 
more deeply for those in a worst financial situation, and during the economic recovery years, 
this gap between the sounder and weaker firms has not fallen, signalling a change in the 






                                                                          
13 For the three different kind of firms, this probably is computed using the average firm fixed effect for the whole period 
and the average bank-time fixed effect for each month. 
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 19 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 1826 
5 Conclusions 
Using a dataset that merges information of loan applications from the Spanish CCR with firms’ 
financial accounts, we have provided evidence that access of firms to bank loans depends 
positively on the strength of their balance sheets, their creditworthiness, their productivity, their 
size, their age and the number of firm’s bank relationships. These results are, in general, 
consistent with previous research. 
In line with the prediction of the financial accelerator theory and with previous empirical 
papers, we find evidence that during the great recession access to credit of firms with weak 
balance sheets deteriorated relative to other firms. However, contrary to this theory, during the 
recovery phase after the crisis access to credit of weaker firms did not improve relative to other 
firms and it even further deteriorated somewhat. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
paper that finds this result.  
This result also contrasts with the relationship between bank’s borrower selection and 
GDP growth found in other empirical papers. In particular, Jiménez, Moral-Benito and Vegas 
(2018) found that when GDP grows banks do not discriminate among borrowers according to 
their risk. Our results suggest that the empirical relationship between bank’s borrower selection 
and GDP growth documented in the previous paper seems to be dominated by the behaviour 
of banks during the expansionary period before the crisis but it does not hold during the 
expansionary phase after the crisis. 
These results suggest that during the current expansionary period banks are 
discriminating more among firms according to the strength of their balance sheets in 
comparison with the situation before the crisis. In particular, banks’ lending policies are now 
more sensitive to firms’ indebtedness and financial burden. Various factors can potentially 
account for this change. First, this change might have resulted from the lessons learnt by 
banks during the crisis. In particular, the great recession of the Spanish economy was 
accompanied by a significant deterioration of bank balance sheets to the point that a 
restructuring and recapitalization of the banking system was needed. Second, the restructuring 
of the banking system has implied a change in the banking structure: weaker banks have either 
disappeared or been acquired by stronger banks, the governance and regulation of savings 
banks (which accounted for around half of the banking system in terms of lending before the 
crisis) have changed significantly. Third, as a result of the crisis the regulation of banks have 
been reformed at the international level with the aim to improve their resilience and their 
procyclical behaviour. In this paper none of these hypotheses have been tested. We left this 
important issue for future research. 
Finally, we provide empirical evidence that lending policies of banks with firms they 
have exposures before the lending decision is taken are comparatively less sensitive to public 
information than those applied to new firms. This is another contribution of the paper. This 
result, together with the positive correlation we find between firms’ access to bank loans and 
the number of bank credit relationships, might be linked to the existence of private information 
developed by banks through their interaction with borrowers (Diamond, 1984; Cole, 1998).  
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1 ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING A LOAN WITH ANY BANK
(annual average)
%
(a)  The computation of these probabilities are based on the results from specification 6 of Tables 3 and 5 (depending on the definition of the probability of 
obtaining a loan).For the computation of the probability for the median firm, the median value over the whole sample period of every independent variable is 
taken and kept constant over time. For firms in a weaker and a stronger financial positions, the value of the 90th and 10th percentiles, respectively, of the 
financial burden and the indebtedness are taken and the median for the other variables and also kept constant over time. For the three types of firms, the 
average  firm fixed effect is considered for the whole period and the corresponding month fixed effect is added.

























2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
FIRM WITH A WEAKER FINANCIAL POSITION
FIRM WITH A SOUNDER FINANCIAL POSITION
MEDIAN FIRM
ESTIMATED PROBABILITY OF OBTAINING A LOAN WITH A NEW BANK
(annual average)
%
(a)  The computation of these probabilities are based on the results 
from specification 6 of Table 7. For the computation of the probability 
for the median firm, the median value over the whole sample period of 
every independent variable is taken and kept constant over time. For 
firms in a weaker and a stronger financial positions, the value of the 
90th and 10th percentiles, respectively, of the financial burden and the 
indebtedness are taken and the median for the other variables and 
also kept constant over time. For the three types of firms, the average  
firm fixed effect is considered for the whole period and the average 
bank-time fixed effect for each month.
TABLE 1. DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
Variable Definition
Loan approved by any bank Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan was granted by any bank and 0 otherwise
Loan approved by at least one new bank Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the loan was granted by at least one new bank and 0 otherwise
Previous doubtful loans Dummy variable that takes value 1 if the firm had in the previous month any non-performing loan and 0 otherwise
Indebtedness Ratio of total debt minus trade credit liabilities minus cash and other liquid assets over total assets
Financial burden Ratio of financial costs over gross operating profit plus financial revenues
ROA Ordinary return on assets
Productivity Logarithm of total factor productivity
No. of previous bank relationships Number of banks with which the firm had credit relationships in the previous month
Size Logarithm of total assets in thousand euro
Age Logarithm of the number of years of existence of the company plus one
Tangible assets Ratio of total tangible fixed assets over total assets


































Loan approved by any bank
TOTAL SAMPLE 0.677 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.468
2005:1-2008:3 0.766 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.423
2008:4-2013:9 0.653 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.476
2013:10-2016:6 0.633 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.482
Loan approved by at least one new bank
TOTAL SAMPLE 0.432 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.495
2005:1-2008:3 0.532 1.000 0.000 1.000 0.499
2008:4-2013:9 0.392 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.488
2013:10-2016:6 0.415 0.000 0.000 1.000 0.493
Previous doubtful loans
TOTAL SAMPLE 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.132
2005:1-2008:3 0.007 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.085
2008:4-2013:9 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.132
2013:10-2016:6 0.032 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.175
Indebtedness
TOTAL SAMPLE 0.270 0.196 0.000 0.683 0.288
2005:1-2008:3 0.332 0.275 0.000 0.787 0.316
2008:4-2013:9 0.260 0.190 0.000 0.653 0.279
2013:10-2016:6 0.217 0.129 0.000 0.575 0.260
Financial burden
TOTAL SAMPLE 1.875 0.212 0.000 11.554 3.939
2005:1-2008:3 1.476 0.174 0.000 11.551 3.528
2008:4-2013:9 2.003 0.240 0.000 11.556 4.042
2013:10-2016:6 2.052 0.203 0.000 11.554 4.123
ROA
TOTAL SAMPLE 0.088 0.050 -0.082 0.290 0.671
2005:1-2008:3 0.100 0.057 -0.030 0.279 0.612
2008:4-2013:9 0.090 0.050 -0.102 0.303 0.712
2013:10-2016:6 0.071 0.042 -0.093 0.272 0.633
Productivity(b)
TOTAL SAMPLE -1.065 -1.081 -1.837 -0.226 0.755
2005:1-2008:3 -1.081 -1.104 -1.872 -0.214 0.783
2008:4-2013:9 -1.095 -1.105 -1.838 -0.303 0.740
2013:10-2016:6 -0.976 -0.983 -1.792 -0.113 0.751
No. of previous bank relationships
TOTAL SAMPLE 2.404 2.000 0.000 6.000 2.594
2005:1-2008:3 2.596 2.000 0.000 6.000 2.773
2008:4-2013:9 2.402 2.000 0.000 6.000 2.566
2013:10-2016:6 2.173 1.000 0.000 5.000 2.411
Size(c)
TOTAL SAMPLE 6.389 6.431 4.313 8.382 1.651
2005:1-2008:3 6.228 6.291 4.110 8.266 1.707
2008:4-2013:9 6.440 6.487 4.377 8.404 1.632
2013:10-2016:6 6.460 6.467 4.401 8.464 1.613
Age(d)
TOTAL SAMPLE 2.266 2.398 1.099 3.219 0.876
2005:1-2008:3 1.946 2.079 0.693 2.996 0.932
2008:4-2013:9 2.302 2.485 1.099 3.219 0.854
2013:10-2016:6 2.571 2.708 1.609 3.332 0.716
Tangible assets
TOTAL SAMPLE 0.308 0.228 0.007 0.757 0.284
2005:1-2008:3 0.291 0.204 0.003 0.741 0.283
2008:4-2013:9 0.317 0.241 0.009 0.765 0.286
2013:10-2016:6 0.306 0.225 0.008 0.754 0.281
(a)Number of observations for the whole period: 951,635; for period 2004Q1-2008Q1: 240,649; for period 2008Q2-2013Q3: 498,094; for 
period 2013Q4-2016Q2:  212.892.
(c) Size variable is the logarithm of total assets in thousands euro.
(d) Age variable is the logarithm of the age in years plus one.
(b) Productivity in logarithms. The total number of observations for this partiuclar variable is 789,871 for the whole period; for period 
2004Q1-2008Q1: 195,872; for period 2008Q2-2013Q3: 419,599; for period 2013Q4-2016Q2: 174,400


























PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.025 ** ‐0.024 ** ‐0.021 * ‐0.021 * ‐0.021 * ‐0.021 *
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.024 *** ‐0.024 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.040 *** ‐0.037 *** ‐0.035 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FINANCIAL BURDEN 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA ‐0.005 * ‐0.005 ‐0.005 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.006 *** 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE ‐0.003   ‐0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000   0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.017 ** ‐0.018 *** ‐0.013 ** ‐0.015 ** ‐0.012 **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MARGINAL IMPACT FOR 2008:4‐2013:9
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS*P2 0.022 * 0.020 * 0.024 ** 0.021 * 0.024 ** 0.024 **
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
INDEBTEDNESS*P2 ‐0.034 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.037 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.042 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FINANCIAL BURDEN*P2 ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA*P2 0.004   0.004 * 0.005 **
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY*P2 ‐0.003   0.002
(0.002) (0.002)
Nº OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS*P2 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000)
SIZE*P2 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.009 *** 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE*P2 0.010 *** 0.010 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 *** 0.015 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
TANGIBLE ASSETS*P2 ‐0.027 *** ‐0.027 *** ‐0.029 *** ‐0.027 *** ‐0.030 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
MARGINAL IMPACT FOR 2013:10‐2016:6
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS*P3 ‐0.022 * ‐0.024 * ‐0.021 * ‐0.024 * ‐0.021 * ‐0.021 *
(0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
INDEBTEDNESS*P3 ‐0.047 * ‐0.052 *** ‐0.053 *** ‐0.057 *** ‐0.054 *** ‐0.067 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
FINANCIAL BURDEN*P3 ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA*P3 0.006 *** 0.006 ** 0.009 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
PRODUCTIVITY*P3 ‐0.012 *** ‐0.005 **
(0.003) (0.003)
Nº OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS*P3 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 *** 0.008 *** 0.009 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE*P3 0.011 *** 0.011 *** 0.006 *** 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE*P3 ‐0.011 *** ‐0.013 *** ‐0.007 * ‐0.008 ** ‐0.008 ** ‐0.008 **
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TANGIBLE ASSETS*P3 ‐0.025 *** ‐0.024 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.035 *** ‐0.039 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.384 0.395 0.394 0.395 0.394
Number of observations 789,871 789,871 951,635 951,635 951,635 951,635
(a) All results derived from linear probability models estimated using least squares, including firm and month fixed effects and clustering at the firm level. In 
parenthesis, the standard deviation of the coefficients is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance of the coefficients, respectively.
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2 SPECIFICATION 3 SPECIFICATION 4 SPECIFICATION 5 SPECIFICATION 6




























PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.025 ** ‐0.024 ** ‐0.021 * ‐0.021 * ‐0.021 * ‐0.021 *
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.024 *** ‐0.024 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.040 *** ‐0.037 *** ‐0.035 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FINANCIAL BURDEN 0.000   0.000 0.000   0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA ‐0.005 * ‐0.005 ‐0.005 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.006 *** 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS 0.007 *** 0.007 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE ‐0.003   ‐0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000   0.000
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE 0.010 *** 0.009 ** 0.001 0.001 0.001   0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.017 ** ‐0.018 *** ‐0.013 ** ‐0.015 ** ‐0.012 **
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
TOTAL IMPACT FOR 2008:4‐2013:9
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.003   ‐0.004 0.003 0.001 0.003   0.003
(0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.058 *** ‐0.062 *** ‐0.071 *** ‐0.077 *** ‐0.071 *** ‐0.078 ***
(0,005) (0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,004) (0,004)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 ***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
ROA ‐0.001   ‐0.001 0.000
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.003   0.007 ***
(0,002) (0,002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS 0.013 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 *** 0.014 ***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
SIZE 0.008 *** 0.010 *** 0.009 *** 0.011 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 ***
(0,002) (0,002) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
AGE 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 *** 0.016 ***
(0,005) (0,005) (0,004) (0,004) (0,004) (0,004)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.044 *** ‐0.045 *** ‐0.042 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.042 ***
(0,006) (0,006) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005)
TOTAL IMPACT FOR 2013:10‐2016:6
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.046 *** ‐0.048 *** ‐0.042 *** ‐0.045 *** ‐0.042 *** ‐0.042 ***
(0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.071 *** ‐0.076 *** ‐0.091 *** ‐0.097 *** ‐0.091 *** ‐0.102 ***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 ***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
ROA 0.002   0.002 0.004
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
PRODUCTIVITY ‐0.006 *** 0.000
(0,002) (0,002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS 0.013 *** 0.013 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 *** 0.014 *** 0.015 ***
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
SIZE 0.008 *** 0.010 *** 0.006 *** 0.008 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 ***
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
AGE ‐0.002 ‐0.004 ‐0.006 ‐0.007 ‐0.006   ‐0.007
(0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.043 *** ‐0.042 *** ‐0.051 *** ‐0.050 *** ‐0.051 ***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006)
Adjusted R2 0.384 0.384 0.395 0.394 0.395 0.394
Number of observations 789,871 789,871 951,635 951,635 951,635 951,635
(a) All results derived from linear probability models estimated using least squares, including firm and month fixed effects and clustering at the firm level. In 
parenthesis, the standard deviation of the coefficients is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance of the coefficients, respectively.
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2 SPECIFICATION 3 SPECIFICATION 4 SPECIFICATION 5 SPECIFICATION 6



























PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.105 *** ‐0.105 *** ‐0.107 *** ‐0.108 *** ‐0.107 *** ‐0.108 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.024 *** ‐0.026 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.038 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.001 * ‐0.001 ** ‐0.001 ** ‐0.001 **
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA ‐0.003   ‐0.005 ** ‐0.004 **
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.007 *** 0.010 ***
(0.003) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK  ‐0.049 *** ‐0.049 *** ‐0.052 *** ‐0.052 *** ‐0.052 *** ‐0.052 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE ‐0.012 *** ‐0.009 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.014 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.016 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE ‐0.005   ‐0.006 ‐0.015 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.015 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.036 *** ‐0.039 *** ‐0.025 *** ‐0.029 *** ‐0.024 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
MARGINAL IMPACT FOR 2008:4‐2013:9
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS*P2 ‐0.001   ‐0.003 ‐0.001 ‐0.006 ‐0.001   ‐0.001
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
INDEBTEDNESS*P2 ‐0.074 *** ‐0.080 *** ‐0.068 *** ‐0.075 *** ‐0.069 *** ‐0.070 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
FINANCIAL BURDEN*P2 ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA*P2 0.001   0.004 0.006 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY*P2 ‐0.003   0.004
(0.003) (0.003)
Nº OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS*P2 ‐0.006 *** ‐0.006 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.005 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE*P2 0.024 *** 0.023 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 *** 0.019 *** 0.020 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE*P2 0.004   0.003 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.009 *** 0.010 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TANGIBLE ASSETS*P2 0.006   0.008 ‐0.002 0.001 ‐0.003  
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MARGINAL IMPACT FOR 2013:10‐2016:6
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS*P3 ‐0.025   ‐0.028 ‐0.029 ‐0.033 * ‐0.029   ‐0.028
(0.020) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
INDEBTEDNESS*P3 ‐0.052 *** ‐0.058 *** ‐0.061 *** ‐0.067 *** ‐0.062 *** ‐0.080 ***
(0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
FINANCIAL BURDEN*P3 ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
ROA*P3 0.004   0.006 ** 0.010 ***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
PRODUCTIVITY*P3 ‐0.012 *** ‐0.003
(0.003) (0.003)
Nº OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS*P3 ‐0.005 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.001 0.000 ‐0.001   0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE*P3 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.019 *** 0.021 *** 0.020 *** 0.018 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE*P3 ‐0.023 *** ‐0.025 *** ‐0.019 *** ‐0.019 *** ‐0.019 *** ‐0.019 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
TANGIBLE ASSETS*P3 ‐0.032 *** ‐0.029 *** ‐0.047 *** ‐0.041 *** ‐0.047 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.121 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137
Number of observations 789,871 789,871 951,635 951,635 951,635 951,635
(a) All results derived from linear probability models estimated using least squares, including firm and month fixed effects and clustering at the firm level. In 
parenthesis, the standard deviation of the coefficients is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance of the coefficients, respectively.
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2 SPECIFICATION 3 SPECIFICATION 4 SPECIFICATION 5 SPECIFICATION 6




























PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.105 *** ‐0.105 *** ‐0.107 *** ‐0.108 *** ‐0.107 *** ‐0.108 ***
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.024 *** ‐0.026 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.038 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.001 * ‐0.001 ** ‐0.001 ** ‐0.001 **
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA ‐0.003   ‐0.005 ** ‐0.004 **
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.007 *** 0.010 ***
(0.003) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS ‐0.049 *** ‐0.049 *** ‐0.052 *** ‐0.052 *** ‐0.052 *** ‐0.052 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE ‐0.012 *** ‐0.009 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.014 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.016 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE ‐0.005   ‐0.006 ‐0.015 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.015 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.036 *** ‐0.039 *** ‐0.025 *** ‐0.029 *** ‐0.024 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
TOTAL IMPACT FOR 2008:4‐2013:9
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.106 *** ‐0.109 *** ‐0.109 *** ‐0.114 *** ‐0.109 *** ‐0.109 ***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.098 *** ‐0.106 *** ‐0.107 *** ‐0.118 *** ‐0.106 *** ‐0.107 ***
(0,006) (0,006) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.004 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.005 ***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
ROA ‐0.001   ‐0.001 0.002
(0,002) (0,001) (0,001)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.003 * 0.014 ***
(0,002) (0,002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS ‐0.056 *** ‐0.055 *** ‐0.056 *** ‐0.056 *** ‐0.056 *** ‐0.057 ***
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
SIZE 0.012 *** 0.014 *** 0.004 *** 0.007 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
(0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
AGE ‐0.001   ‐0.003 ‐0.005 ‐0.006 ‐0.005 ‐0.005
(0,006) (0,006) (0,005) (0,005) (0,005) (0,004)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.030 *** ‐0.031 *** ‐0.027 *** ‐0.028 *** ‐0.027 ***
(0,007) (0,007) (0,006) (0,006) (0,006)
TOTAL IMPACT FOR 2013:10‐2016:6
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.130 *** ‐0.133 *** ‐0.136 *** ‐0.140 *** ‐0.136 *** ‐0.136 ***
(0,009) (0,009) (0,008) (0,008) (0,008) (0,008)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.076 *** ‐0.084 *** ‐0.100 *** ‐0.110 *** ‐0.100 *** ‐0.118 ***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,006)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.005 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.005 ***
(0,000) (0,000) (0,000) (0,000)
ROA 0.001   0.002 0.006 ***
(0,003) (0,002) (0,002)
PRODUCTIVITY ‐0.005 ** 0.007 ***
(0,003) (0,002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS ‐0.054 *** ‐0.054 *** ‐0.053 *** ‐0.052 *** ‐0.053 *** ‐0.052 ***
(0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001) (0,001)
SIZE 0.014 *** 0.017 *** 0.004 ** 0.007 *** 0.004 ** 0.003
(0,003) (0,003) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002) (0,002)
AGE ‐0.028 *** ‐0.031 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.034 ***
(0,008) (0,008) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.068 *** ‐0.068 *** ‐0.072 *** ‐0.071 *** ‐0.072 ***
(0,009) (0,009) (0,007) (0,007) (0,007)
Adjusted R2 0.121 0.121 0.137 0.137 0.137 0.137
Number of observations 789,871 789,871 951,635 951,635 951,635 951,635
(a) All results derived from linear probability models estimated using least squares, including firm and month fixed effects and clustering at the firm level. In 
parenthesis, the standard deviation of the coefficients is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance of the coefficients, respectively.
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2 SPECIFICATION 3 SPECIFICATION 4 SPECIFICATION 5 SPECIFICATION 6



























PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.093 *** ‐0.094 *** ‐0.097 *** ‐0.098 *** ‐0.097 *** ‐0.097 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.022 *** ‐0.025 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.037 *** ‐0.037 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA ‐0.004 ‐0.004 ** ‐0.003 *
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.002 0.007 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS ‐0.033 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.035 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE ‐0.014 *** ‐0.012 *** ‐0.017 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.017 *** ‐0.017 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE ‐0.013 *** ‐0.013 *** ‐0.020 *** ‐0.019 *** ‐0.019 *** ‐0.020 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.026 *** ‐0.029 *** ‐0.014 ** ‐0.018 *** ‐0.013 **
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MARGINAL IMPACT FOR 2008:4‐2013:9
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS*P2 0.000 ‐0.001 0.002 ‐0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.018) (0.018) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)
INDEBTEDNESS*P2 ‐0.083 *** ‐0.088 *** ‐0.072 *** ‐0.077 *** ‐0.072 *** ‐0.073 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
FINANCIAL BURDEN*P2 ‐0.002 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA*P2 0.002 0.003 0.005 **
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY*P2 0.001 0.006 **
(0.003) (0.003)
Nº OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS*P2 ‐0.008 *** ‐0.008 *** ‐0.007 *** ‐0.007 *** ‐0.007 *** ‐0.007 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE*P2 0.025 *** 0.025 *** 0.022 *** 0.023 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE*P2 0.004 0.003 0.008 *** 0.007 *** 0.008 *** 0.008 ***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
TANGIBLE ASSETS*P2 0.005 0.006 ‐0.001 0.002 ‐0.002
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
MARGINAL IMPACT FOR 2013:10‐2016:6
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS*P3 ‐0.014 ‐0.016 ‐0.017 ‐0.020 ‐0.017 ‐0.017
(0.019) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
INDEBTEDNESS*P3 ‐0.057 *** ‐0.060 *** ‐0.057 *** ‐0.060 *** ‐0.058 *** ‐0.070 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (0.007)
FINANCIAL BURDEN*P3 ‐0.002 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 *** ‐0.003 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000)




Nº OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS*P3 ‐0.001 ‐0.001 0.001 0.002 * 0.001 0.002 **
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE*P3 0.024 *** 0.025 *** 0.019 *** 0.021 *** 0.019 *** 0.019 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE*P3 ‐0.027 *** ‐0.028 *** ‐0.023 *** ‐0.024 *** ‐0.024 *** ‐0.024 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TANGIBLE ASSETS*P3 ‐0.018 ** ‐0.017 * ‐0.032 *** ‐0.028 *** ‐0.033 ***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.144 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157
Number of observations 953,566 953,566 1,148,024 1,148,024 1,148,024 1,148,024
(a) All results derived from linear probability models estimated using least squares, including firm and bank*month fixed effects and clustering at the firm level. In 
parenthesis, the standard deviation of the coefficients is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance of the coefficients, respectively.
SPECIFICATION 1 SPECIFICATION 2 SPECIFICATION 3 SPECIFICATION 4 SPECIFICATION 5 SPECIFICATION 6







PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.093 *** ‐0.094 *** ‐0.097 *** ‐0.098 *** ‐0.097 *** ‐0.097 ***
(0.017) (0.017) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.022 *** ‐0.025 *** ‐0.038 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.037 *** ‐0.037 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 *** ‐0.002 ***
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.003 ***
(0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.002 *** 0.007 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS ‐0.033 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.035 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE ‐0.014 *** ‐0.012 *** ‐0.017 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.017 *** ‐0.017 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE ‐0.013 *** ‐0.013 *** ‐0.020 *** ‐0.019 *** ‐0.019 *** ‐0.020 ***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.026 *** ‐0.029 *** ‐0.014 *** ‐0.018 *** ‐0.013 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
TOTAL IMPACT FOR 2008:4‐2013:9
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.093 *** ‐0.095 *** ‐0.095 *** ‐0.099 *** ‐0.095 *** ‐0.095 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.105 *** ‐0.113 *** ‐0.110 *** ‐0.120 *** ‐0.110 *** ‐0.110 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA ‐0.002 ‐0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
PRODUCTIVITY 0.003 * 0.013 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS ‐0.040 *** ‐0.040 *** ‐0.041 *** ‐0.041 *** ‐0.041 *** ‐0.041 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE 0.011 *** 0.013 *** 0.006 *** 0.008 *** 0.006 *** 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
AGE ‐0.009 * ‐0.010 ** ‐0.012 *** ‐0.011 *** ‐0.011 *** ‐0.011 ***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.022 *** ‐0.023 *** ‐0.015 *** ‐0.016 *** ‐0.015 ***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
TOTAL IMPACT FOR 2013:10‐2016:6
PREVIOUS DOUBTFUL LOANS ‐0.108 *** ‐0.110 *** ‐0.114 *** ‐0.118 *** ‐0.114 *** ‐0.114 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
INDEBTEDNESS ‐0.079 *** ‐0.085 *** ‐0.095 *** ‐0.103 *** ‐0.095 *** ‐0.107 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
FINANCIAL BURDEN ‐0.004 *** ‐0.004 *** ‐0.005 *** ‐0.004 ***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ROA 0.003 0.003 0.006 ***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
PRODUCTIVITY ‐0.003 0.007 ***
(0.002) (0.002)
NUMBER OF PREVIOUS BANK RELATIONSHIPS ‐0.034 *** ‐0.034 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.033 *** ‐0.033 ***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
SIZE 0.010 *** 0.013 *** 0.003 0.005 *** 0.003 0.002
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
AGE ‐0.040 *** ‐0.042 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.043 *** ‐0.044 ***
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
TANGIBLE ASSETS ‐0.045 *** ‐0.046 *** ‐0.046 *** ‐0.046 *** ‐0.046 ***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Adjusted R2 0.144 0.144 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157
Number of observations 953,566 953,566 1,148,024 1,148,024 1,148,024 1,148,024
(a) All results derived from linear probability models estimated using least squares, including firm and bank*month fixed effects and clustering at the firm level. In 
parenthesis, the standard deviation of the coefficients is reported. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% statistical significance of the coefficients, respectively.
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